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Abstract 
Political finance scholars have paid little attention to the partisan preferences of business 
donors.  This was because business donors were overwhelmingly concerned with the left-right 
dimension and enjoyed stable relationships with centre-right parties.  These parties are 
increasingly tempted by economic nationalism.  This new ideological flux provides an 
opportunity to measure the extent to which donors are party identifiers or react to changes in 
the policy space. Dramatic shifts in party policy on both the left-right and globalisation 
dimensions and a relatively transparent political finance regime make the UK a particularly 
apposite case to study this question. I analyse 19,000 donations to the Conservative Party 
and show that business donors reacted strongly to recent shifts on both the left-right and 
globalisation dimensions.  Thus, centre-right parties may not be able to rely on party 
identification and their left-right position to maintain business funding.  Economic nationalism 
is likely to cost centre-right parties money.  
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Capitalism can be a problem for democratic politicians.  The concentration of economic power 
that capitalism produces challenges the political equality on which democracy is premised.  
The relationship between capitalism and democracy can be particularly controversial in 
political finance (Scarrow 2007, 193), where business money can give an important advantage 
to favoured candidates and parties (Jacobson 1998; Fisher 1999).  Nevertheless, scholars of 
political finance have paid little attention to the party political preferences of business.  This 
was for the very good reason the there was so much stability in the policy space relevant to 
business and the relationships between political parties and their business funders.  The left-
right dimension was the only dimension of party competition considered by business and 
parties tended not to switch places on this continuum.  This stability made it difficult to assess 
the strength and nature of business preferences and whether business donations to parties were 
a rational choice or a relatively automatic party identification.  The policy space for business 
is no longer stable and its party political preferences can no longer be taken for granted. 
The consensus on economic globalisation is breaking down.  Centre-right parties have to 
decide whether to adopt nationalist positions on multilateral economic governance.  This 
represents the emergence of a second policy and ideological dimension (Inglehart and Norris 
2016) that is vital to business.  Political parties may be position close to business on the left-
right dimension, but far from business on the globalisation dimension.  This puts business in 
the difficult political situation of having to decide whether the left-right or globalisation 
dimension is most important.  This dilemma is particularly acute for business funders of 
political parties.  Contemporary British politics offers special opportunities to study this issue.  
The Conservative Party committed itself to a so-called “Hard Brexit” that almost inevitably 
involves reduced access to the largest market for UK business, along with disruption of long-
established supply chains.  The Labour Party has its most left-wing leader since at least 1983 
and the radical left is increasingly prominent at all levels of the party.  This is distressing for a 
3 
 
business sector that has relied on and bankrolled the Conservative Party as its political 
representative for a century and, not so long ago, enjoyed the Labour Party also making a claim 
to be the “Natural Party of Business”.  The funders of the Conservative Party need to make up 
their minds as to which is more frightening, the left-wing politics of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour 
or the nationalist foreign economic policy of Theresa May’s Conservative Party.   
In the new more complex and fluid policy space, donations to political parties can provide 
new insights into the preferences of donors and indeed into whether policy positions, or party 
identification, drive donations.  Britain’s system of political finance regulation offers a clearer 
insight than most because it is relatively permissive and transparent.  It is permissive in that 
there is little constraint on the size, purpose, and timing of donations.  They represent their 
donors’ intentions, not the effects of regulation.  It is transparent in that the source and size of 
many donations is reported.  I study 19,000 donations to the Conservative Party between 2001 
and the end of 2017.  My equations show that Corbyn’s election was associated with a very 
large influx of donations to the Conservative Party and the Brexit vote was associated with a 
smaller drop in donations.  This suggests a major constraint on the longer-term adoption of a 
nationalist agenda by the Conservative Party.  The Tories risk sacrificing their party’s finances 
and, therefore, some of their electability, for the sake of a nationalist position in foreign 
economic policy.  This result raises the question of the relative salience of the two dimensions 
to business sectors in other countries where national populism appears to be on the rise. 
The article proceeds by locating this work in the literature on business and political finance.  
It argues that an analogy between business donations to parties and electoral behaviour is a 
useful way to approach political finance in an era of ideological change.  Next, I argue that the 
UK is a good case because the recent policy shifts by both major parties offer variation on the 
independent variable and the political finance regime allows a relatively clean measure of the 
preferences of donor businesses.  In the empirical section, I study business and individual 
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donations from 2001 to 2017.  I also study the impact of the media prominence of the “Hard” 
and “Soft Brexit” options in the Brexit era.  The conclusion summarises implications for 
political finance theory and party competition in established democracies. 
 
Business, Preferences, and Political Finance 
Power and preferences have been the two main concerns of scholars of business and politics.  
For a long time, the literature emphasised structural power (Lindblom 1977; Offe 1985, 170–
220).  The dependence of democratic politics on the capitalist economy gave business a 
structural advantage.  According to this theory, the threat, or even possibility, of disinvestment 
was seen as enough to ensure that politicians maintain business-friendly policies.  Structural 
power made intentional power, principally lobbying and financial donations, both more 
effective and less necessary.  However, there is lots of evidence that democratic politicians 
defy businesses.  Ultimately, office-seeking politicians are elected by voters, not firms, and 
policy-seeking politicians often want to constrain, rather than facilitate, businesses.  The theory 
of quiet politics asserts that “[B]usiness power goes down as political salience goes up” 
(Culpepper 2011, 177).  When voters and the media are paying attention, politicians are 
sceptical of business arguments.  By contrast, the public have little interest in most of the arcana 
of public policy that impact business.  In these low-salience areas, politicians tend to defer to 
the expertise of business.  Business has a particular “informational privilege” (Bernhagen 2007, 
135) that allows it to convince politicians to adopt policies that fully-informed policy-makers 
would reject as detrimental to their voters’ interests.   
Power has also been a concern of the more specific literature on business financing of 
politics.  The nature and the extent of the power of business donations depend on their 
motivation.  Business donors have pragmatic or ideological motivations (Harrigan 2017).  “The 
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pragmatic motivation seeks private goods … pragmatic money is interested money” 
(McMenamin 2013, 8).  It is rare for business to directly buy policy in established democracies.  
Many of the more convincing accounts of the relationship between donations and policy can 
also be thought of in terms of salience and information.  Policy-makers are time-poor, as well 
as information-poor.  They cannot give a full hearing to all of the informationally-privileged 
business actors clamouring to lobby them.  Moreover, politicians want to minimise the electoral 
costs of being perceived to be make decisions for the good of businesses instead of voters.  
Money can improve access to policy-makers in order to leverage informational advantages in 
low-salience areas.  In these situations, there is a reciprocal exchange between business donors 
and politicians. In reciprocal exchanges, each actor’s part of the exchange is separately 
performed and terms are unstated and uncertain (Molm 2000, 261-2). These reciprocal 
exchanges protect politicians against accusations that they are selling decisions, as there is no 
direct connection between the donation and public policy (McMenamin 2013a, 12; 
McMenamin 2013b, 22).  This is one reason that statistical studies find it so hard to demonstrate 
a relationship between political finance and policy (Stratmann 2017, 12-18).  The other is that 
many donations are ideologically motivated (Ansolabehere et al. 2003; McMenamin 2012, 2).  
Ideological payments promote a public good.  “They express a preference for government 
based on a particular set of values and assumptions” (McMenamin 2013, 8).  Ideological 
donations are not strictly rational for a profit-seeking firm because there is little chance that 
such donations will decide an election.  Thus, ideological donations are like voting or joining 
a social movement. 
The preferences of business can be studied individually or systemically.  The Varieties-of-
Capitalism studies how national political and economic institutions shape business preferences 
over public policy.  These institutions were born out of negotiations around the time of the 
birth of mass democracy and labour unionism.  In multi-party systems, right-wing party leaders 
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had incentives to delegate decision-making to business associations and labour unions (Martin 
and Swank 2012, 3).  They believed that a corporatist framework was more beneficial to 
business than fighting a losing battle in a legislature where farmers’ and workers’ parties could 
outvote pro-business parties. By contrast, in two-party systems, the right concentrated on the 
prize of a majority in the legislature and had much weaker incentives to delegate policy to 
representative associations.  These different origins explain much about the extent to which 
business acts collectively and its preferences over economic and social policy (Martin and 
Swank 2012, 227).   
The “Open Economy Approach” has also focused on the interaction of economic interests 
and political institutions and is divided into the sector and factor approaches.  A factor of 
production is an input in the production of goods and services, such as land, labour, capital, 
and entrepreneurship.  The factor model assumes that business preferences will be driven by 
the relative prices of capital and labour.  The sector model argues that business preferences will 
be shared with employees and other businesses in the same sector.  For example, the sectoral 
approach might see workers and owners in manufacturing pitted against workers and owners 
in services, whereas, in the factor approach, the owners of manufacturing and services firms 
would be opposed to the workers in both sectors.  Of course, ultimately these economic 
interests have to be processed by institutions within the firm (Martin 1995).  Majoritarian 
electoral systems elect politicians in small territorial units, thereby emphasising sectoral 
preferences, whereas proportional electoral systems elect politicians in large constituencies, 
thereby facilitating the unity of capitalists.   
These theories concentrate on policy preferences, not party preferences.  They assume that 
party preferences follow from policy positions.  In the Varieties-of-Capitalism school the 
importance of political party differences depends on the national institutional comparative 
advantage.  In co-ordinated economies, business associations enjoy deep relations with policy-
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makers regardless of the composition of government (Hall and Soskice 2001).  In liberal 
economies, government-business relations are more distant and also subject to greater change 
when there is a governmental turnover.  Liberal economies are associated with a more intense 
business preference for pro-business parties.  The factor approach should be associated with a 
clear identification with the political right, but the sector approach allows for more nuanced 
partisan preferences, depending on the nature of the sector and common cause with workers.  
Both assume that businesses make a rational choice on the basis of a very, or somewhat, stable 
political economy.  Neither pays much attention to a radical change in the positions of political 
parties.   
The literature on business and political finance has neglected the preferences of businesses.   
In relation to ideological contributions, it has taken preferences over policy and between parties 
for granted.  For over a century this has been a safe assumption for many nations because there 
has been only one relevant dimension of competition and the order of parties on that dimension 
has not changed.  This dimension has been the classic left-right continuum of state intervention 
versus the free market.  The ideological distance between parties changes as does the location 
of the centre of the policy space.  Nonetheless, parties virtually never exchange positions in 
two-party systems and very rarely do so in multi-party systems.  Therefore, there has been an 
obvious long-term centre-right party, which can receive business funding.  This stability has 
meant that ideological distance, issue salience, and party identification have not been as 
important in the relationship between business and parties as they have been in the electoral 
market.   
Changes in the political preferences of business have ramifications for many of the questions 
studied by political finance scholars.  Regulation affects party competition differently if one 
party can count on donations from business.  If this is so, public funding can reduce the 
financial advantage of such parties (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Van Biezen and Rashkova 
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2014; Potter and Tavits 2013).  Bans, limits, and disclosure requirements can transform a 
financial advantage for pro-business parties into a financial disadvantage (McMenamin 2015).  
If some parties receive substantial funding from business, it is hard to resist the conclusion that 
this will affect public policy when they are in government (Thacker and Pierson 2010).  If 
parties are unequally dependent on business funding, this will influence how they construct 
their interests in political finance reform (Koß 2011; Scarrow 2004).  The way in which broader 
public policy affects funders will depend on whether those funders represent the business sector 
(McMenamin 2012, 9-13; Tomashevskiy 2015).  If some parties are more dependent on 
business than others, this will affect public opinion on political finance, especially preferences 
on the regulation of business donations and the political construction of scandals (Fisher 2015a; 
McMenamin 2015).  Since attitudes to, and relationships with, business are so strongly 
associated with the left-right dimension, they are integral to most party systems.  When 
business donations are legal this means party positions on business tend to be also important 
for political finance.  Indeed, if enforcement is weak, the same can be said for countries where 
business donations are illegal.   
The literature on business donations to political parties has paid little attention to the 
dynamism of parties.  This is for the good reasons that only one dimension has been relevant 
and the order of parties along this dimension has been so stable.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
think that businesses, unlike voters, have not been faced with a choice.  In the absence of 
changes in the policy space big enough to change the preferred party of business, it has not 
been possible to assess whether enduring funding relationships are due to party identification 
on the part of business or the closeness of parties to business in the policy space.  A major 
change to the policy space could reveal much about the policy preferences of donor businesses 
and the extent to which their donations reflect party identification or a rational choice based on 
the party’s policies.   This is not the first study of donations to take inspiration from the voting 
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literature.  Fisher looked at donors in terms of retrospective voting on the valence issue of 
economic performance (Fisher 2000: 187-8), while this article looks at prospective voting.  
Ironically, there are some respects in which theories of voting apply better to political finance 
than they do to voting.  Voting is a rare event, the occasion for which the voter does not choose.  
In some electoral systems, voters are offered a categorical choice and in others they are 
presented with an ordinal choice.  Since donors control when, how often, and how much they 
donate their donations can provide much more information about their preferences than do the 
votes of citizens.  The next section argues that Great Britain is a particularly apposite case to 
study this question. 
 
Business and Political Parties in Great Britain 
Business donations to political parties in the Great Britain are largely ideological rather than 
pragmatic.  Businesses do not switch between the two major parties depending on which is in 
government; they do not hedge by contributing to both; and few contribute to the Labour party 
at all.  Donations to the Conservative Party are dynamic and it is possible that some of this 
represents an interaction of ideological and pragmatic motivations, such that businesses only 
donate to their ideologically-preferred partner the Conservative Party, but are more likely to do 
so when there are pragmatic reasons for donating.  In other words, businesses contribute more 
to the Conservatives when they are in government and when they are popular, and therefore 
likely to retain, or regain, control of government.  Nevertheless, my focus will remain on the 
ideological motivation, as this is where party political preferences are relevant.  
The Conservative and Unionist Party has been the party of business in Great Britain for a 
century (Fisher 1994).  Business donors to the Conservative party are connected to the party 
by old social networks centred on elite education and social clubs (Bond 2007).  The social 
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bases of business donations point towards party identification.  The Conservatives moved to 
the right under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and then towards the centre under David 
Cameron from 2005.  Being pro-market has not always meant that the party’s policies were in 
the interests of the business establishment.  For example, financial deregulation under Thatcher 
undermined many banks in the City of London.  Nonetheless, businesses have generally had to 
think about how much they like Conservative policy, not whether they prefer Labour or the 
Conservatives.  The Labour Party has also travelled along the left-right dimension.  It adopted 
a radical leftist manifesto in 1983 and was dragged to the centre by a succession of leaders.  In 
1998 Prime Minister Tony Blair even declared that Labour wanted to be the “natural party of 
business”.  This does appear to have generated some new support, especially from very rich 
individuals, but also from the corporate sector (Fisher 1997: 240-241).  Nonetheless, business 
continued to provide substantial funding to the Conservatives, while contributing little to 
Labour (McMenamin 2011). Individual donations do not seem to have been made on behalf of 
businesses (McMenamin 2011: 1037-1038).  Thus, very few businesses considered a choice 
between Labour and the Conservatives.  It might be argued that this suggests party 
identification amongst Conservative donors, who would not switch even to a competent and 
economically orthodox Labour party.  However, New Labour remained committed to a range 
of centre-left social policies, including substantial public spending on health and education.  
Overall, party competition has not allowed for a distinction between party identification and 
rational policy choice. 
 In recent years, the Conservatives have reported a lower income than their Labour rivals 
(Fisher 2015b, 134; Fisher 2018, 177), although this largely consists of small donations 
associated with the party leadership elections of 2015 and 2016 and did not have to be 
individually declared.  In terms of declared donations, from 2001 to 2017, the Conservatives 
raised fifteen per cent more than Labour.  If their income from business had been the same as 
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Labour’s they would have raised twelve per cent less in declared donations.1  Since British 
parties are among the poorest in Europe (Poguntke, Scarrow, and Webb 2016: 665), it is likely 
that financial shortfalls have greater consequences than in countries where parties are not so 
lean.   
Like other actors, businesses look to the leadership for an indicator of the policies of a 
political party.  Therefore, I concentrate on the party leaderships, not the members or the 
parliamentary parties.  For one hundred years, business was able to assess politics along one 
dimension, the left-right continuum.  Since the Conservatives were always to the right to 
Labour, business did not have much difficulty in choosing its favourite.  The emergence of 
Jeremy Corbyn has re-emphasised the importance of this dimension.  However, Brexit has 
introduced a new nationalism-globalism dimension.  The Conservative party policy is still 
centre-right on left-right issues.  However, its ‘Hard Brexit’ policy is a nationalist position that 
emphasises national sovereignty and local control and is hostile to the pooling of sovereignty 
with other European countries and any notion of foreign influence over trade policy.  Many 
Brexiteers advocate ‘a global Britain’, champion free trade and de-regulation, and want to pivot 
away from declining Europe to the dynamism of Asia and Britain’s former colonies.  They do 
not propose protectionism or self-sufficiency, but all such trade must happen in the context of 
national sovereignty.  Indeed, national sovereignty, ‘taking back control’, not a new economic 
dynamism, often appears to be the ultimate aim (Shrimsley 2018).  For the first time in a 
century, there is no British party which is clearly pro-business.  There is a Conservative Party 
that is nationalist in foreign economic policy and a Labour Party that is socialist in domestic 
economic policy.  The ideological position of the parties as a whole has moved in the same 
direction, but much less dramatically than that of their leaderships (Schmitt and Loughran 
                                                          
1 These figures are from the UK Electoral Commission and exclude public funds. Business donations are 
defined as contributions from companies and limited liability partnerships.   
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2017).  The Conservative Party has many MPs and members who are concerned about 
economic consequences of a ‘Hard Brexit’.  Many Labour MPs still regard Mr Corbyn’s ideas 
as extreme and impractical.  The opinions of these politicians will be of little comfort to British 
business should the UK leave the EU without a customs union arrangement, or industries be 
renationalised (Gordon and Pickard 2017).    
British business largely supported staying in the EU.  However, a small number of variables 
predicted whether a business was “remain” or “leave”: where the headquarters is located, 
ownership structure, the location of profits or trade, and calculations on foreign direct 
investment (McKay 2016, 3).  The business leaders in favour of leaving the EU traded mostly 
in the UK and saw a “cost advantage or the opportunity to influence the political process after 
separation” (McKay 2016, 3).  After the vote in favour of leaving the EU, the preference for 
remain effectively became a preference for a “soft Brexit” over a “hard Brexit”.  A soft Brexit 
implies minimal disruption, such as leaving the EU institutions but retaining access to the 
European single market and therefore remaining subject to the European law.  A hard Brexit 
implies leaving the single market and usually the customs union too.  The UK would have full 
control over immigration and trade, but would face barriers to trade with the EU.   
A hard Brexit was the policy of the Conservative government from the Party Conference in 
October 2016 to at least until the Chequers meeting of the cabinet in July 2018.  The 
government maintained that divergence in regulation is consistent with continuing frictionless 
trade with Europe.  Critics, including EU negotiators, said this was impossible.  So, the 
implications of the government’s position seemed to point towards a harder Brexit than the 
government’s explicit preferences.  Labour has been unclear and Mr Corbyn ambivalent for 
much of the period since the referendum.  In February 2018, Jeremy Corbyn gave a speech 
committing Labour to negotiating a new customs union with the European Union. It was both 
unsurprising and amazing that business leaders lined up behind socialist Corbyn.  For example, 
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Carolyn Fairbairn, director general of the Confederation of British Industry, said, “The Labour 
leader’s commitment to a customs union will put jobs and living standards first by remaining 
in a close economic relationship with the EU” (Kentish 2018).   
Obviously, Corbyn and Brexit are unique and contingent phenomena.  Corbyn had to be 
persuaded to run for party leader.  He aimed to keep the flag flying for socialism in the Labour 
Party and did not initially regard himself as serious competitor for the leadership.  The Brexit 
referendum resulted from a promise that David Cameron made to quell a rebellious faction in 
his party.  He was not a Brexit advocate and Brexit was a minority position in the parliament 
that approved the referendum.  Of course, the Brexit vote itself was only won by only 3.8 per 
cent.  Nonetheless, both are particular cases of more general phenomena.  The seeming 
abandonment of the median voter for a more ambitious and inspiring ideological vision is 
commonplace in politics, even in largely two-party systems like Britain’s.  The populist revolt 
against globalisation is the political theme of the 2010s.  Centre-right parties in many countries, 
the US, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria, to name a few, tacked towards 
populist positions on immigration and economic globalisation.  The observational equivalence 
of rational choice and party identification donations is typical of the history of many established 
democracies. The potential for the emergence of a second dimension in their contemporary 
politics is also evident in many established democracies.  The tumult of recent British politics 
offers an unprecedented opportunity to study which matters most to the business sector, the 
left-right dimension or the nationalism-globalism dimension?  It also allows us to probe 
whether donations are motivated by a rational choice or party identification.  Next, I introduce 
the data I use to study these questions. 
 
Data from the UK Electoral Commission 
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The data on British political donations, like that generated by perhaps all disclosure regimes 
other the USA’s, is under-utilised.  I study all 18,963 donations reported by all units of the 
Conservative Party between 12 February 2001 and 31 December 2017.  This represents 6,166 
days and approximately 6,225 donors.  The data was cleaned to reduce over-counting of donors 
due to typographical errors, spelling, punctuation, honorific variations, and donations by 
different sections or brands of the same business.    A prominent example of the latter is JC 
Bamford Excavators, JCB Sales, JCB Research, etc.   Nonetheless, there is still some small 
over-counting of the number of distinct donors.  The purpose of the analysis is to assess how 
this highly politicised section of the business community, the Conservative donors, reacted to 
the election of Corbyn and the decision to the leave the European Union.   
Much good work on business donations is organised as a panel.  Since this data contains the 
identity of donors and time of donation, it appears to meet the criteria for a panel analysis.  
However, there are several limitations.  While the data is daily, no business donated on a daily 
or weekly basis, very few more often than annually, with many contributing only once a 
parliament or, indeed, only once in the whole seventeen years.  There is no information about 
the donors other than the amount and timing of the donation.  Therefore, they cannot enter the 
dataset until they make a donation, as it is not known if the business even existed prior to that.  
Since there is no information about the businesses, it is not possible to explore various 
economic arguments about why donation rates and strategies might vary by type of business.  
Previous panel analyses in this literature draw their sample from economic databases, prior to 
checking whether the businesses have donated or not.  In many cases, including that of the UK, 
this ends up with very sparse numbers of donations.  In this article, I am able to study a very 
large number of donations and donors.  This research investigates how politicised businesses 
react to changes in the political system, especially the policy positions of political parties. To 
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this end the observations are daily aggregates.  The dependent variable is the number of distinct 
donors on a given day. This is intended to gauge donor support for the Conservatives.    
The Electoral Commission classifies donations by the legal status of the donor.  I exclude 
all such categories other than individual, company, and limited liability partnership.  This 
means three categories representing substantial funds are not included.  These are public funds, 
trusts, and unincorporated associations.  The latter two types of donor tend to be fundraising 
arms of the Conservative Party itself, such as Holborn & St Pancras Conservative Association 
or the Lord Woolton Luncheon Club.2  The other categories are only responsible for small 
amounts.  I combine the legal categories of company and limited liability partnership and label 
them as business, to indicate the overwhelming probability that they are profit-seeking 
organisations.  The dependent variable is computed for individual and business donors.  Due 
to the regulatory changes of 2010 models are restricted to donations of at least £7,500 to 
achieve consistency over time. 
To control for variations in the pragmatic and ideological motivations over time, I include 
a number of control variables.  First, there is an indicator for whenever the Conservatives are 
in government. In the British political system, the government is very powerful and the 
legislature traditionally weak.  If government is associated with more donations, this could 
indicate a pragmatic motivation.  Second, there is an indicator for electoral campaigns, defined 
as the period from the dissolution of parliament to election day.  Ideological donors help their 
preferred party when its need is greatest; pragmatic donors may also calculate that the 
reciprocation is more likely when money is provided at a time of great need.  Third, there is a 
count of the days since the election.  Pragmatic donations should be negatively associated with 
this variable because the more time a party has in power the more likely it is to be able to 
                                                          
2 Unincorporated Associations are required to report gifts in excess of £7,500 in a calendar year, but only one 
association has reported such gifts and then from only two sources.   
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deliver a policy benefit.  Ideological donations should be positively associated with it, as donors 
will wish to help their party prepare for a forthcoming election.  Fourth is the election 
countdown variable, with a maximum of 365 if there is one year to a mandatory election.  This 
captures the traditional build-up of the parties’ war chests in the last year of a parliament (Fisher 
2000: 198-200).   Fifth is the Conservatives’ lead over Labour as measured by ICM’s voting 
intention polls.  Pragmatic donors will know that a popular party is more likely to be able to 
deliver benefits than an unpopular one.  Popularity may also be positively associated with 
ideological donations, as businesses share in general approval of the party’s positioning in the 
policy space. Sixth and last is a time trend. 
The independent variables are indicators for the periods since the election of Corbyn and 
the Brexit vote.  Corbyn represents a major policy shift on the part of the Labour party on the 
left-right dimension. Brexit represents a major policy shift on the part of the Conservative Party 
on the globalisation dimension.  If business donors did not react to these shifts, they seem to 
be driven by party identification, not rational choice.  While the Brexit and Corbyn shifts were 
both very large, it is not possible to say which was larger.  Nonetheless, a big difference 
between the reactions to the two shifts would appear to suggest that one dimension is more 
salient than the other.   
Figure 1 shows donations by distinct individual and business donors, as well as the 
Conservatives’ lead in polls over Labour, across the whole time period.  There is evidently a 
strong correlation between individual and business donations.  Moreover, the importance of 
the control variables is obvious.  The number of donations climbs steeply around each of the 
five elections in the dataset.  There also seems to be a strong association between the popularity 
of the Conservatives and donations.  The time trend is subtler, but it appears to increase over 
time.   
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Comparing business and individual donations allows a probe of the validity of inferences 
about business donations.  There are very strong theoretical reasons to expect contrasts in the 
behaviour of businesses and individuals.  Businesses are rational by design.  Directors are 
obliged to promote the financial interests of shareholders.  This means that businesses are more 
likely to make pragmatic donations, and less likely to make ideological donations, than 
individuals (Baker 2018: 578; McMenamin 2009; Burris 2001).  If control variables linked to 
pragmatism are more strongly associated with business donations, inferences about motivation 
are that much stronger.   Relative business rationality is also relevant to preferences.  Business 
preferences should be more driven by the policy space, as opposed to party identification, than 
the preferences of individual donors.  To the extent that business reactions to policy shifts are 
stronger than those of individuals, inferences about the source of preferences are stronger.  
 
Figure 1. Donations by Distinct Donors (Lowess smoothed) 
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Table 1 presents regressions evaluating the impact of Corbyn and Brexit on donations to the 
Conservative party by businesses and individuals.  Since the dependent variable is an 
overdispersed count I use a negative binomial model.  The standard errors are HAC Newey 
West to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.   
[Table 1 about here] 
The control variables show the expected contrasts between distinct business and individual 
donations.  Government is associated with a large increase in business donations, but the 
increase for individual donations is just over a third of that for business and is statistically 
insignificant.  The campaign is associated with more donations, whether business or individual.  
However, the increase is about fifty per cent bigger for individuals, which makes sense, given 
that this period would appear to be more likely to attract ideological than pragmatic donations.  
The number of days since the election is positively associated with both business and individual 
donations, suggesting an ideological motivation, and the coefficients are virtually the same 
size.  The election countdown is also positively associated with distinct business and individual 
donations, although the effect is bigger for businesses.  Finally, both are again positively 
associated with the Conservatives’ lead over Labour.  The coefficient is slightly bigger for 
business, perhaps suggesting a more pragmatic motivation, but the difference between it and 
the coefficient for individuals is statistically insignificant.  These comparisons suggest the 
reassuring conclusion that business donations are more pragmatic than individual donations.  
Next come the two policy shifts.  Corbyn’s election provided a very large stimulus to business 
donations, but did not have a statistically significant effect on individual donations.  Brexit had 
a large negative effect on both, but the coefficient in the individuals’ equation is over eighty 
per cent bigger than that in the business equation.  These contrasts suggest that business reacts 
more to policy shifts than individuals, probably because individuals are more driven by 
identification with the Conservative Party instead of a rational choice linking party policy to 
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financial gain.  They might also imply that the businesses and individuals attribute different 
saliences to the two dimensions represented by Corbyn and Brexit.  The left-right dimension 
may not matter so much to individual donors, compared to the globalisation dimension.  
Donation patterns suggest that both the left-right and globalisation dimensions are important 
to the Conservative business donors. 
 
Figure 2. Selected coefficients from Model One 
 
Figure 2 plots key coefficients and confidence intervals from the business equation.  Its 
purpose is to illustrate the magnitude of the effects of the policy changes, compared to the other 
variables which capture ever-present aspects of political competition and the electoral clock.  
They suggest that both policy shifts had very large effects on donor behaviour.  Corbyn’s 
election generated a bonus in business donations almost exactly the same as being in 
government.  Brexit produced a reduction in donations that was over one third of the gain from 
Government
Campaign
SD change in days since election
SD change in election countdown
SD change in lead over Labour
Corbyn
Brexit
-.5 0 .5 1
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being in government.  Both the policy shifts have effects that are much smaller than the influx 
of donations associated with a parliamentary election campaign.  However, this is a very 
unusual and short period of political life.  Corbyn’s effect was greater than a standard deviation 
increase in the number of days since an election (515 days), while the effect of Brexit was a 
little bit smaller than this standard deviation increase.  Corbyn had an effect double the size of 
a one standard deviation (six per cent) increase in the Conservatives’ lead over Labour, while 
Brexit’s magnitude was seventy five per cent of this increase in the Conservatives’ lead.  The 
coefficients from a negative binomial model are difficult to interpret directly.  The Incidence 
Rate Ratios for Model One imply that donations under Brexit were 87 percent of what they 
otherwise would have been and that donations after Corbyn were 151 per cent of what they 
otherwise would have been.  This analysis shows that both policy shifts had the potential to 
transform the relationship between the Conservative Party and its donors.  Without Jeremy 
Corbyn, Brexit would have exerted financial pressure on the Conservatives.  Due to the impact 
of Corbyn the Conservative treasury has been insulated from the effect of the party’s turn 
towards economic nationalism.     
These figures are consistent with different donation patterns.  For example, it could be that 
party identification was unaffected if loyal donors contributed at the same rate before and after 
Brexit, but the number of new donors fell substantially.  In order to explore this and related 
possibilities, I studied the re-donation and new donation rates before and after Brexit.  I split 
each into two periods, so that I can distinguish re-donation and new donation for a given period 
of identical length.  Given the finding above that Corbyn’s election provided a strong stimulus 
to business donations, I end the first period for Brexit prior to that event.  This reduces the 
likelihood of finding a negative impact of Brexit on either re-donation and/or new donation.   
Figure 3 shows the set-up for Brexit and pre-Brexit.  The second periods for the Brexit and 
pre-Brexit calculations are quite similar in terms of the regular political variables studied 
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above, as Table 2 shows.  The Conservatives were in government and there was an election in 
both periods.  The Conservatives had a four-point lead in the Brexit period, compared to 
virtually a dead heat in the pre-Brexit period.  The average number of days until an election 
was also over three times greater in the pre-Brexit period.  Again, this suggests a reduced 
likelihood of a fall in re-donation and new donation in the Brexit era.  However, the Brexit 
period shows a reduction in both re-donations and new donations.  In the pre-Brexit period, 
there was a loyalty rate of fifty-five per cent, meaning that over half of those donating in the 
comparison period donated again.  By contrast, in the Brexit period, this was only thirty-three 
per cent.  Similarly, the new donor rate was much higher in the pre-Brexit period, in which 
seventy-eight per cent were new donors, compared to only fifty-eight per cent in the Brexit 
period.  Regardless of donor strategy, there was a large negative Brexit effect.3  This is further 
evidence of the dominance of rational choice, rather than party identification.   
The interplay of the two types of donors is potentially interesting.  If policy preferences are 
more important than party identification, a shift away from the preferred positions of business, 
should make a party more dependent on party identifiers.  We can see this already in Table 2.  
The drop in new donors means that the proportion of donors in the loyal category has increased, 
even as the loyalty rate has decreased.  These donors may be hard-core party identifiers who 
will stick with the Conservative Party, irrespective of its economic policy. 
 
                                                          
3 It is not possible to use a similar design for Corbyn.  The Brexit referendum happens soon after Corbyn’s election 
and any pre-Corbyn period must include the 2015 election, while the period between Corbyn’s election and the 
Brexit referendum does not feature a general election.  
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Figure 3. Research design for strategy analysis 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
The preceding analysis has tested the hypotheses that Brexit and Corbyn constitute structural 
breaks in business donations to the Conservatives.  It is also possible to think of them as 
temporary disturbances, the influence of which should wane over time.  I estimated models in 
which the Brexit and Corbyn effects decay by the exponent of 0.001 for each day that passes.  
This means that Corbyn has decayed to 0.43 by the end of the dataset and Brexit to 0.57.  This 
procedure has little effect on the Corbyn coefficient, but reduces the size of the Brexit 
coefficient by 41 per cent.  If the decaying version of Brexit is combined with the binary 
Corbyn, or even a growing Corbyn, it increases massively.  So, these robustness tests show that 
Corbyn is relatively impervious to specification, but that Brexit is sensitive.  This is more 
evidence that the Corbyn effect is stronger than the Brexit one.  However, there are good 
substantive and technical reasons to prefer the simpler binary coefficients reported in Table 1.  
Technically, there are forty-nine per cent more observations of the Corbyn era and, as noted 
above, almost one-third more variation in the decay variable.  Substantively, the nature of 
Brexit was highly uncertain during the period under study, therefore it would be odd if its 
impact steadily decayed.  Since the debate was ongoing, I next explore the relationship between 
donations to the Conservatives and different Brexit options.  
The period since the referendum on leaving the EU is clearly a new era in British politics.  
Nonetheless, not all Brexits are equally damaging for business.  British politics has been 
dominated by a debate about what sort of Brexit the UK should seek.  A “hard Brexit” aspires 
to a substantial disengagement from the EU, freeing the UK from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and allowing the UK to negotiate its own trade deals.  A “soft Brexit” means 
a modest separation with the UK remaining in the Single Market and subject to the EU’s 
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jurisdiction, but withdrawing from its decision-making institutions.  In Table 3, I present 
assessments of the impact of the debate on the nature of Brexit on Conservative donations.  
Since it is restricted to the period since the referendum there are no Brexit, Corbyn, or 
Government variables.  Neither is there an Election Countdown variable as at no point did 
British politics enter within a year to a mandatory general election.  I add two new variables, 
Hard and Soft, which measure the number articles every fortnight in the British press 
mentioning “Hard Brexit” and “Soft Brexit” respectively.4  Figure 3 shows that the Hard and 
Soft variables are highly dynamic and strongly correlated with each other.  However, Hard 
seems much more prone to spiking.  The two tallest spikes relate directly to Prime Minister 
Theresa May’s two clearest speeches on Brexit.  They indicate a high level of validity.  Since 
the Hard and Soft variables are non-stationary, I use the first difference of both. 
 
Figure 4. Articles Mentioning Hard and Soft Brexit 
                                                          
4 These are the twenty print and on-line titles in the Lexis News database.   
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Note: The variables represent two-weekly totals of articles returned by keyword search on 
Nexis news, with intermediate points interpolated.   
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
Like the previous equations, these exhibit the theoretically expected contrasts between 
business and individual donations.  As before the campaign displays a larger increase in 
individual donations than business donations, consistent with the idea that the campaign is 
associated with ideological donations and individuals are more likely to be ideologically 
motivated.  Effectively, of course, this means the 2017 election campaign.  Days since the 
election has virtually the same effect on business donations, as it has in the much longer time 
series.  However, the effect on individual donations is over twice its previous size.  Again, 
this fits the hypothesis that individual donations are more ideological and ideological 
donations are more likely to be made as an election approaches.  The Hard and Soft variables 
have a greater effect on business donations than on individual donations, perhaps because 
businesses are paying more attention to the Brexit news.  The coefficient for Hard in the 
business equation is about one third larger than in the individual equation.  Soft has a much 
bigger effect in both equations and the coefficient in the business equations is almost twice 
the size of its equivalent in the individual model.  The metric of the Hard and Soft variables 
produces small coefficients.  Table 4 uses Incidence Rate Ratios to calculate the impact of one 
standard deviation changes in Hard and Soft on business donations.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Different versions of Brexit have substantial effects on business donations.  A one standard 
deviation decrease in articles mentioning “Hard Brexit” implies a sixteen per cent increase in 
donations.  A one standard deviation increase in “Soft Brexit” is predicted to increase donations 
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by thirty-three per cent.  For comparison, a one standard deviation reduction (5.9 per cent) in 
the Conservative lead is associated with a forty-four per cent reduction in annual business 
donations.  Obviously, this analysis is restricted to a much shorter period than earlier models.  
Furthermore, this is a particularly volatile period in British politics.  For example, Prime 
Minister Theresa May called an election in 2017 to exploit her commanding lead in opinion 
polls, but her popularity plummeted in the few weeks of the campaign.  Also, the volume of 
mentions of Soft Brexit is a little bit thin for the sort of inferences I am hoping to make.  
Nonetheless, the figures clearly point towards business sensitivity to subtler moves on the 
globalisation dimension, as part of the Brexit negotiations within the Conservative Party and 
between the UK and the EU.  Moreover, it is consistent with anecdotal evidence (Coates 2018). 
 
Conclusions 
Many business donors to the Conservative party are not party identifiers.  If they were, they 
would have maintained donations, irrespective of the policy shift represented by Brexit.  There 
were very large reactions to the major events of Corbyn’s election and the Brexit vote and 
donations were highly sensitive to news about the specific form Brexit might take.  Instead of 
party identification, many business donors make calculations on the basis of the location of 
parties in the policy space and pay close attention to actual, and likely, moves in that policy 
space.  This article has not shown, however, that donors switch party because of policy.  Voting 
theory is a well-developed set of ideas that can reveal much about donor behaviour.  It can also 
help integrate political finance with more general work on party competition.  Perhaps best of 
all, voting theory can bring political finance into contemporary debates about dramatic changes 
in political ideology and public policy in established democracies. 
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The partisan preferences of business donors can no longer be assumed because of the demise 
of the consensus on globalisation.  The role of the state in the economy and the management 
of inequality continue to be contested, as they have been since the first mass-suffrage elections.  
This dimension has recently been separated from contestation of the extent to which the state 
will engage in frameworks of multilateral economic governance.  If centre-right parties move 
away from their previous pro-globalisation position and consequently lose the financial 
backing of business this may have positive democratic consequences in the area of political 
finance.  Where parties are dependent on business for funding, they have incentives to resist 
transparency, limits on donations, and public funding.  Consequently, if centre-right parties 
decided they do not need business funding, they may allow reforms that ensure that citizens, 
not firms, fund party competition. 
The electoral consequences depend on the direct effect of policy changes on voters (voters 
gained less voters lost) and the indirect effect of voters lost due to more meagre financial 
resources.  Vote-seeking and office-seeking are not always equivalent in multi-party systems.  
Shifts away from globalisation may increase the chances of new coalitions with the populist or 
radical right but reduce the likelihood of more traditional coalitions with liberal parties.  
Coalitions with parties that are more hostile to globalisation, and may previously have been 
pariahs, are also likely to reduce business funding.  The British case offers both reassurance 
and a warning to other business-funded parties considering a foray along the globalisation 
dimension.  It is reassuring that the financial flood from Corbyn’s election was greater than the 
financial drought attributable to Brexit.  This suggests that the left-right dimension remains 
more salient than the globalisation dimension.  A pro-business position on the left-right 
dimension may allow centre-right parties to limit the financial damage from anti-globalisation 
moves.  It is a warning that Brexit could have been a severe financial constraint for the 
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Conservatives if it were not for Labour’s lurch to the left.  Other centre-right parties cannot 
rely on their competitors to be so obliging.   
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